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TANEY'S INFLUENCE .ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
EDWIN BORCHARD *
HE hundredth anniversary of the elevation of Roger Brooke
Taney to the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
affords a fitting occasion to review the significance of his judi-
cial services to the nation and to American constitutional law.
A re-examination of his life work in the perspective of history
indicates how unwise it often is to form rigid judgments on men
and events in the excitement of contemporary emotion, for the
harsh opinions which Taney evoked by his decisions on the
slavery question have been tempered in the detached light of
reason. The historical cloud under which his name so long
rested because of his views on the constitutional issues arising
out of slavery, has diverted popular though not professional
attention from the distinguished judicial service he rendered the
country in other matters over a period of twenty-eight years as
Chief Justice. Learned, profound, objective and by nature a
just man of impeccable character, he represents the finest tra-
ditions of the American judiciary. Though gentle, courteous
and kindly, he was vigorous and convincing in the assertion of
his legal positions and, in the light of a century of perspective,
remarkably sound and prophetic. The brilliance and vigor of
the Jackson Administration derived substance and spirit from
the powerful mind of Taney, Jackson's Attorney General and
Secretary of the Treasury. Taney's attack on the United
States Bank was conceived in no narrow bias, but was founded
on broad but determined views of public policy. And if, in the
partisanship of that contest, his first appointment as Associate
Justice of the Court was rejected by the Senate, Taney lived to
see himself confirmed as Chief Justice over the opposition of
political enemies, and had the satisfaction of receiving an apol-
ogy and retraction from one of their leaders, Henry Clay, who
* manfully admitted that his opposition had not been well-
founded.
,Taney came to the Court after many of the guiding lines
* Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University School of
Law; author of DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1914), Gov-
ERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT (1928), CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
(1932), DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934), and numerous other books and
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of constitutional development had already been laid out by
Marshall. Taney had been a Federalist himself, and saw no
objection to strong federal power when this seemed necessary
in the interests of national unity. He was less politically parti-
san than Marshall in this respect, because he had become a
Jeffersonian Democrat and was perhaps better able to appre-
ciate the necessities of state power and of limitations on federal
control. While devoted to the constitutional philosophy of in-
alienable individual rights-except for Negroes-to be protected
against the government and the official hierarchy by safeguards
expressly incorporated in the earlier Amendments, he neverthe-
less recognized the necessity for governmental control of private
activity in a growing industrial society. While his most strik-
ing constitutional decision was overruled at Appomattox and
while he lived before the great industrial expansion which
tested mightily a people's and a Court's capacity to adjust a
written Constitution to the needs of a dynamic society, never-
theless some of the fundamental principles of government con-
trol, if not of the social struggle, were hammered out in the
period during which Taney presided over the Supreme Court.
Although Taney's background as a country gentleman and
landholder identified primarily with agricultural interests is
supposed to explain his hostility to the growth of corporations
and the influence of urban capital, a decision like that in Bank
of Augusta v. Earle 1 confutes the theory of a deep-seated prej-
udice. Coming after the great Federalist Marshall, at a time
when industry and population were beginning to grow and with
them the necessity for police power regulation, it is perfectly
natural that he should have perceived the propriety of limiting
private liberty and property in the public interest. His democ-
racy was genuine and his interest in public welfare that of the
liberal. It was therefore consistent, in the light of such state
decisions as Baker v. Boston,2 recognizing the necessity of pub-
lic encroachment on theretofore unrestricted private interests,
that Taney should sustain the State's police power in such cases
113 Pet. 141 (1840) (permitting a corporation to migrate and do
business outside the state of its creation, assent thereto by the new state
being assumed unless expressly denied).










t -except -to t
t l rchy r s
l t i r ts, -
it t l
t
i tit ti l i i rr l t tt
il li t t i tri l i n i
t t i til l 's rt' it t j t
itt tit ti t t f i i t , r-
t l t
t l, t i l t l , t i t
'





it , t l





e t f re t te
i '
113 Pet. 141 (1840) (per itting a corporation to igrate and do
s i , t
ly ied).
i . ( . ); . lt 'V
).
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
as City of New York v. Miln,3 in the Passenger Cases,4 the
License Cases 5 and the Warren Bridge case.6 If this is con-
ceived as a predilection for State's Rights, it was a healthy
reaction from the centralizing tendencies of Marshall which
perhaps proceeded too rapidly.
But at that time the principal federal limitations on state
police power were the interstate commerce and the contract
clauses, and Taney was notoriously averse to evolving a sub-
jective limitation out of his own conscience under the title of
natural law, later so commonly wrapt in the phrase "due proc-
ess of law" of the 14th Amendment.7 If Taney manifested a
disposition to support the theory of concurrent power over
interstate commerce until Congress took over the field,8 he was
in the best tradition of the modern Court which also respects
the right of the states to control their internal affairs until it
becomes plain that the national power must be unhampered by
local restrictions. It is safer to err on the side of the concur-
rent power, for if Congress thinks the power should be exclu-
sively federal, it is simple so to provide. Probably Taney would
have joined the dissenting minority in Di Santo v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania 9 and in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 10
and would have been sustained by much professional opinion
in so doing. Taney's opinion in the New Hampshire License
3 11 Pet. 102 (1837). New York regulations to prevent the settlement
of immigrants likely to become public charges. Thompson, J., was desig-
nated to write the opinion, but on a division as to the commerce power,
Barbour, J, assumed the task. Parts of the opinion were objectionable
to some of the judges.
47 How. 283 (1848). Taney dissented from the Court's opinion hold-
ing invalid a New York law which imposed a tax on incoming foreign
passengers to maintain a marine hospital, and a Massachusetts law requir-
ing the master to file a bond that the passenger would not become a public
charge. The nine judges wrote eight opinions, indicating the confusion.
The Court divided, five to four. Taney's opinion is striking.
5 5 How. 573 (1847) (that the states had the right to regulate the
sale of liquor even though coming from another state).
6 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (1837).
7Cf. decision of Taft, C. J. in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
8 Cf. opinion in Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), in which
Tsney was one of the majority judges.
9 273 U. S. 34 (1927).
10 244 U. S. 205 (1917). The unhappy progeny of this case has seri-
ously impaired the rights of longshoremen and harbor workers, who even
under the federal Act are threatened with the necessity of litigation over
an issue of jurisdiction, state or federal.
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case,' had it been followed and not overruled by the Bowman
case in 1888,12 would have made unnecessary the Wilson Act,
the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Reed Amendment, which prac-
tically brought the law back to the point where Taney would
have left it, and then went beyond in enlarging state control
over the liquor traffic.
Taney's Court had no occasion to deal with the acute prob-
lem as to how far the Federal Government may legislate for
the economic welfare of the country under the interstate com-
merce power. The cases before the Court involved the extent
to which the commerce clause limited the state's right to regu-
late by legislation matters which it considered necessary for
its own protection. No dogmatic formula could decide this issue
and in the solution of particular case problems the judges dif-
fered greatly. Possibly the fear of federal aids to business, or
of federal control of the slave traffic and slavery, impelled the
Jackson appointed judges to lean to the support of state power
unless it conflicted with federal legislation. At all events,
Taney, who was not averse to the public control of business,
did not feel it necessary strictly to limit state legislation by
virtue of the commerce clause. Even into this problem there
was injected the embittered issue of slavery, for when Missis-
sippi sought in 1832 to prevent the further importation of
slaves, the members of the Court in vigorous dicta expressed
divergent views on the state's power thus to interfere with
interstate commerce.' 3
But if Taney was merely a State's Rights man, how can
one account for such powerful federalizing opinions as Ableman
v. Booth,34 a landmark in constitutional law, denying the state's
power to interfere with the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over a federal prisoner; as Holmes v. Jennison,15 affirming the
exclusive federal power over extradition; as Dobbins v. Erie
County,16 denying the state's power to tax the compensation of
a federal officer; as Almy v. Californi, 17 denying the state's
11 5 How. 577 (1847) (sustaining the state's power to control the
liquor traffic).
12 Bowman v. Chicago and N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465 (1888) (holding
that liquor remains in interstate commerce until its arrival in the state
and its sale in the original package).
13 Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449 (1841), described in SWISER, ROGFM
B. TAN-BY (1935) 396-399.
1421 How. 506 (1858).
1514 Pet. 540 (1840).
1616 Pet. 435 (1842) (Taney concurred).
1724 How. 169 (1860).
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power to tax commodities leaving the state. Even in the first
of the License Cases 18 he had shown an excellent appreciation
of the line between federal and state power over interstate com-
merce, and denied the right of a state to prevent the importation
of liquor from other states.
In the Genesee Chief 19 Taney sustained the federal power
over all navigable waters, and breaking with the narrow view
of Marshall and Story in The Thomas Jefferson 20 that ebb and
flow were the criterion of the admiralty jurisdiction, had no
difficulty in extending widely the jurisdiction of the national
government. He also manifested an engaging willingness to
overrule an earlier decision, when it was found to be unsound
or out of harmony with new conditions, a tradition since then
most usefully developed by the Court.2
1
If Taney is known as an upholder of the state's police power
in its encroachment on individual privilege, is he inconsistent
in his apparent respect for the rights of the individual against
invasion by government officials? In his defense of free
speech, 22 in his defense of private property against government
confiscation or official transgression,23 in his refusal to permit
even the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
foreclose judicial redress of a person arrested by the military, 24
he sustained the rights of the private individual in their most
dramatic and difficult setting. In spite of his supposed sym-
pathy for public control of private interests, he respected prop-
erty rights, especially real property, and was not willing to
permit mortgagees to be deprived of their rights, after the
panic of 1837, by legislation cutting down the contract rights
of creditors for the benefit of debtors. 25 And yet, so flexible
was his mind, that I venture to believe he would have joined
Is 5 How. 554, 576 (1846).
19 Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (1851).
20 10 Wheat. 428 (1825).
21 See dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Washington v. W. C. Daw-
son & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 235 (1924).
22 See the account .of Taney's defense of Reverend Gruber, an Abolish-
ionist, in SMITH, ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSONIAN JURIST (1936) 178;
SwIsHER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 95, 414.
23United States v. Guillem, 11 How. 47 (1850); Mitchell v. Harmony,
13 How. 115 (1851).
24 Ex parte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (C. C. D. Md. 1861).
25 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (1843). Taney thought that control
over the currency and the banks was a better method of protecting debtors
from the burdens of the business cycle. Probably this was hardly justified.
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the majority in upholding the Minnesota Moratorium legisla-
tion of 1933.2
6
Nevertheless, so strongly was he convinced that Govern-
ment may also be imposed upon, especially by corporate inter-
ests who usually draw their own charters, that he was averse
to any bargaining away of the police power, the power of emi-
nent domain or the taxing power.27 The burden of proving the
derogation from the public right was thrown on the private
interest, and while a clear contract for good consideration for
exemption from taxation, for example, would be upheld,
28 it
had to be made exceptionally clear that the exemption was ade-
quately paid for and that no supervening right of the public
was impaired. Thus, he had no great difficulty in finding, con-
trary to a vociferous public opinion, that the charter of the
Charles River Bridge Company must be strictly construed
against the private interest and broadly in favor of the public,
and that the failure expressly to grant the Charles River toll
bridge a long-term monopoly debarred it from claiming a legal
impairment of its rights by a competing concession to the War-
ren Bridge, a free bridge. "While the rights of property are
sacredly guarded," said Taney, "we must not forget that the
community also have rights, and the happiness and well being
of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation." That
compromise represents a general principle which has been con-
tinually applied to a constantly evolving economic scene. By
thus weakening the effect of the Dartmouth College case,
29
which seemed to make a property or contract right impreg-
nable against legislative change, Taney gave a fruitful and in-
deed conservative valde to the term "vested rights." The ri-
gidity of Marshall's view might have led to violent overthrow;
the flexibility of Taney's helped to produce a better-balanced
relationship between the private and the public interest, by
safeguarding the essence while subjecting to modification under
the police power or the reserved power of change in charters,
rights that require public control. It represented statesman-
ship of a high order.
261Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398
(1934). The dissenting judges relied on Taney's views in Bronson v.
Kinzie.
27Ohio Life Insurance Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416 (1853).
28 Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 392 (1853).
29 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
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All this has been said to indicate how difficult and vain is
the attempt to give so emancipated a mind as that of Taney
a definite classification. As a judge, Taney cannot be consid-
ered a member of any particular school of economic or polit-
ical thought. But for the question of slavery, the period in
which he presided over the Court would have been anything
but the Tragic Era. It was marked by territorial expansion
and by the beginning of large-scale industrial enterprise. The
coming struggle for social control had not yet reached the Court,
as it did later under what the Marxians call monopoly and
finance capitalism. Hence the Court, though closely watched by
both conservative and liberal, was less concerned with the strug-
gle between economic classes which today marks the most
crucial activity of the Court, than with the political balance
between conflicting interests of state and federal government,
of corporate assumption of public privileges and franchises, of
governmental interference with individual initiative. Again,
except for the issue of slavery, the economic system, individ-
ualism, and laissez faire, as vehicles of social progress, were not
seriously questioned. It was in the balance between the depart-
ments of the government that the protection of the individual
was deemed to lie. The modern function of the Court, as a
stabilizer of social forces in the face of immense economic
power, had not then arisen or been clearly sensed. But never-
theless the beginnings of this economic struggle were even then
discernible, first, in the abortive and disastrous struggles over
slavery as a social policy, and then in the effort of corporations
to obtain control of economic processes against the restrictive
efforts of state legislatures and popular and individual protest.
Taney was purely a pragmatist, and though occupied mostly
with the question of political rather than social distribution of
power, nevertheless realized both the dangers involved in the
unlimited scope of corporate control and the necessity of public
regulation. The Federalists had considered that a state could not
deny a foreign corporation the privilege of doing business, and
preferred to regard the corporation as a person and citizen with
the constitutional protection accorded private individuals.
Taney took a different view, which for decades became the law
of the Constitution. While eschewing artificial barriers to cor-
porate expansion beyond the state of incorporation, he never-
theless supported the state's power to exclude a foreign cor-
poration from intrastate commerce, as well as the state's power
[Vol. 24
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of regulation; and as againsti the state itself, the narrowest
construction of corporate charters. If in the course of time
foreign corporations have gradually been saved from excep-
tional discrimination by an expansive interpretation of the
equal protection of the laws clause, and the more recent doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, the fundamental principles of
Taney's compromise between the unlimited right to do business
abroad and the unlimited right of the state to exclude still
stands. The lamented Gerard Henderson, in his excellent work
on Foreign Corporations 30 says of Taney's opinion in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle:
"The opinion in those cases, rendered in Chief Justice Taney's
best vein, has generally been looked upon as the original fountain
head of the law of foreign corporations in America. The terse and
quotable style of the opinion, its philosophical flavor, and its clear-cut
reasoning combined to give even the dicta of the Chief Justice an au-
thority which was to stand unquestioned for half a century."
Notwithstanding Taney's fears of the dangers of corporate
wealth to the private citizen and to the community, he never-
theless accepted corporations as part of the instruments of
commercial life and would not deprive them of judicial pro-
tection for what he conceived their legitimate claims. Taney
approved the trail-blazing decision of the Court, enabling a
foreign corporation to remove a case from a state to a federal
court when litigating with citizens or corporations of states
other than that of its creation. 31 While this conclusion was
violently objected to, then and since, and at the present day has
given rise to a formidable campaign to prevent removal from
the courts of states in which the corporation does business, it
still remains the law.
Taney's support of contracts, even in the form of a charter
between the corporation and the state, led him to protect cor-
porate privileges in a way which subsequent Courts found it
convenient to follow. After 1868, they no longer had to rely
on the contract clause, but successfully invoked the due process
and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment as bul-
warks against legislative interference with property and con-
30 POSITION op FOREIGN CoRPoRATIoNs IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1918) 42.
S3 Louisville, Cincinnati & Charlestown R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How.
497 (1844).
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tract, corporate or individual. Whether the "liberal" belief
that this has been a public disadvantage is sound or not, it
may be said that in spite of Taney's objection to corporate con-
trol of the country's wealth, the decisions of his Court laid the
foundations of the doctrines which protect it.
A number of Taney's opinions in various departments of
constitutional law deserve special attention because of the con-
tinuing influence they have exerted. Taney contributed greatly
to a better understanding of the scope of the judicial power by
two significant decisions: Lord v. Veazie 32 and Gordon v.
United States.'- In the former, in an opinion which cites no
previous authority, he laid down the fundamental line demark-
ing the boundary between justiciable and non-justiciable con-
troversies, so far as concerns the necessary legal and adverse
interest in judicial relief of the parties litigant. That case still
stands as a landmark in the discussion of the issues involved in
the moot case, the advisory opinion, and the justiciable contro-
versy, which so greatly has occupied the Supreme Court in
recent years. In the latter case, evoking the last opinion Taney
ever wrote, and adopted by the surviving members of the Court
after his death, he defined the necessity for finality of the judg-
ment as a criterion of the constitutional exercise of the Supreme
Court's judicial power. He refused, for the Court, to take jur-
isdiction over an appeal from a decision of the Court of Claims,
when the Supreme Court judgment was to be itself subject to
review by Congress or an administrative officer and was thus
left in the character of a recommendation only.
In recent years the Supreme Court has gone much beyond
the limitations suggested by Taney in refusing to perceive a
plaintiff's concrete interest or the adversity of interest in a
litigation before the Court, and has therefore declined juris-
diction in a number of cases which the writer believes were
appropriate for judicial determination.3 4 While the Court nec-
32 8 How. 251 (1850).
3117 U. S. 697 (1865) printed in 1885. See also Taney's opinion in
United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1851) to the effect that the award
of a claims commissioner to a Spanish subject under the Treaty with
Spain of 1819 was not the decision of a court from which an appeal lay
to a federal District Court or the Supreme Court. Such a commissioner's
award on a claim against the United States may be made reviewable by
an Executive officer, but not by a United States court. Except for Hay-
burn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), no authority is cited.
34 New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328 (1925); Liberty Warehouse v.
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essarily avoids the adjudication of cases in which its judgment
would be inconclusive,35 there seems little justification for re-
fusing jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff has a
clearly economic or tangible interest which would be definitely
affected by the decision rendered, and where the defendant has
an equally clear interest adverse to that of the plaintiff. Nor
is the issue non-justiciable because two governmental units,
such as the federal and the state governments, litigate the issue
of their respective jurisdictions over a concrete res. In other
federal governments, such as Australia and Canada, this is a
frequent subject of litigation. While the Court has necessarily
built a number of defenses against the attempt to invoke an
inappropriate exercise of judicial power, such as the category
called "political questions," there seems no important reason to
exceed fundamentally the internal technical limitations on jus-
ticiability laid down by Taney.
Taney also realized the inadequacy of judicial power in set-
tling many of the issues that divide men. Possibly if he had
foreseen that the slavery question was to become an emotional
and moral issue, he might have found it preferalfe to avoid
passing on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, as
a political question, and have thus greatly limited the hostility
aroused by the Dred Scott opinion. In Luther v. Borden 36 he
wisely declined to assume jurisdiction over an issue which re-
quired the Court to decide whether the Dorr Government or the
Charter Government of Rhode Island was the lawful govern-
ment of the state. He adduced a variety of cogent reasons why
the assumption of such jurisdiction would be impractical, for
it would produce chaos if the Court were to sustain as lawful
a government that had been ousted or hold unlawful a govern-
ment that wielded all the powers of administration. These
questions, said Taney, were committed to political agencies like
Congress, and the people, and the state, and could not usefully
become the subject of judicial enquiry. That decision had much
influence on the refusal of the Court to examine into the con-
stitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts and the weighty polit-
Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association,
277 U. S. 274 (1928); United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463
(1935).
35 Cf. Factor v. Laubenheimer, U. S. Marshal, 290 U. S. 276 (1933) in
which no extradition was ever accomplished.
367 How. 1 (1848).
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ical powers exercised thereunder by the President and executive
officials. Taney even thought it improper for the Court to ven-
ture to decide a boundary controversy between Rhode Island
and Massachusetts 37 on the ground that it involved an issue of
political jurisdiction and sovereignty and not merely rights of
property; but his dissent to that effect has fortunately not been
sustained and this potent field of dispute has been brought con-
stantly to judicial cognizance. To the writer it emphasizes the
fact that the milder disputes between administrative officials
as to the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions in a con-
crete case are a fortiori subject to judicial determination and
that United States v. West Virginia,38 however correct on the
question of original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, should
not, it is believed, have been considered to involve a non-jus-
ticiable controversy.
An example of Taney's caution and wisdom is found in
Kentucky v. Dennison,89 where the State of Kentucky sought
to mandamus the Governor of Ohio for refusing to surrender
in interstate rendition a fugitive from justice. The fact that
the indictment was for enticing a slave to escape might be
supposed to have enlisted the support of Taney and some of his
colleagues. Kentucky relied on the Act of Congress of, 1793
which declares that "it shall be the duty of the Executive
authority of the State" to cause the fugitive to be arrested and
delivered to the agent of the demanding state. Realizing as a
philosopher the limitations of power and the unwisdom of its
exercise against large groups or public bodies, Taney remarked:
"The words, 'it shall be the duty,' in ordinary legislation, imply
the assertion of the power to command and to coerce obedience. But
looking to the subject-matter of this law, and the relations which the
United States and the several States bear to each other, the court is
of opinion, the words 'it shall be the duty' were not used as mandatory
and compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty which this com-
pact created, when Congress had provided the mode of carrying it
into execution." 40
It can readily be imagined what difficulties would have been
created had the Court given the word "duty" a mandatory con-
notation and undertaken to enforce the duty by the exertion of
37 12 Pet. 657, 752 (1838) ; 4 How. 591, 639 (1846).
38 United States v. West Virginia, 295 U. S. 463 (1935).
39 24 How. 66 (1860).
40 Id. at 107.
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federal force. Taney might have cited the testimony of Ham-
ilton and Madison on the impracticability of seeking to coerce
a state and to expect from coercion useful results. Madison
remarked that "the practicability of making laws, with coer-
cive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been ex-
ploded on all hands." 41 Hamilton characterized it as "one of
the maddest projects ever devised . . . little less romantic than
the monster-taming spirit attributed to the fabulous heroes and
demi-gods of antiquity." 42 Yet today a system of international re-
lations is founded on the theory that independent nations of the
world can be coerced by punitive measures called "sanctions"
and that pacifying results can thereby be produced. If we are
the heir of all the ages in the foremost files of time, how sadly
has our intellectual heritage been squandered. Those who see
in the Kellogg Pact an effective commitment and who, more
especially, so blithely urge the propriety of passing on alleged
breaches and of exerting retaliatory measures on such judg-
ments are evangelically toying with war in a romantic cause
ideally calculated to produce general disorder.
The war with Mexico and its antecedents brought before the
Court several cases in which Taney had occasion to demonstrate
a wide and profound acquaintance with international law in its
relation to constitutional law. In one of these, Kennett v. Cham-
bers,43 Kennett, an American citizen, had lent money in 1863 to
a Texas General, Chambers, to promote the revolution of the
Texas territory against Mexico. The consideration was an agree-
ment by the General to convey certain real property in Texas
to Kennett. The suit was for specific performance of this agree-
ment. Although Texas was subsequently recognized as inde-
pendent by the United States, Taney, in an analytical opinion,
evolved from the wealth and strength of a resourceful mind
rather than from authority, concluded that the contract was -void
as against public policy and the avowed neutrality of the United
States, and that while such a contract of loan in a war between
two independent states might not be open to attack, Texas at
the time was a part of Mexico, under the treaties, laws and
declared policy of the President of the United States, and not-
withstanding Texas' declaration of independence, the contract
412 FARRAim, Records of the Federal Convention, 8-9. (Constitutional
Convention, July 14, 1787).
4216 FEDERALIST (Scott, 1894) 90.
4314 How. 38 (1852).
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was for an American citizen void and illegal, unenforceable
either at law or in equity. Without tintinnabulary professions
of high morality, Taney nevertheless enforced on American citi-
zens the highest standards of correct conduct in the matter of
foreign relations. The opinion has found its way into the case-
books.
In Fleming v. Pge,44 Taney examined the legal position of
territory in Mexico under occupation by American military
forces, and decided that such territory was not part of the
United States in a constitutional sense, although internationally
American authority temporarily prevailed there. He thus jus-
tified the collection of duties on goods shipped, during the Amer-
ican occupation, from Tampico to the United States, and took
occasion to delimit the powers of Congress and the Executive
in dealing with foreign territory under American military occu-
pation. The opinion has remained an authority and was exten-
sively invoked in the decisions in the Insular Cases. The opinion
is again built up on reason alone, for not a single authority or
precedent is cited. Taney's studies on the relation of the Exec-
utive to Congressional power in time of war were later drawn
upon in his vigorous opinion on circuit in Ex parte Merymn,
45
denying the President the power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and to subject a citizen to military trial when the civil
courts were still functioning, a conclusion for which Taney re-
ceived complete vindication after the Civil War in Ex parte Mil-
ligan.46
Taney's opinion in Jecker v. Montgomery 47 afforded him a
splendid opportunity to deal with the legal position of prize
courts under the Constitution, the relation of the Executive to
them, the function they performed and the legal effects of cap-
ture and condemnation. His command of the materials of inter-
national law is that of a master. This was also evidenced in his
opinion in the case of Ardrey v. Karthaus 48 on circuit, in which
he anticipates the precise ground of the award in the later "Ala-
ba-ma" claim against Great Britain, by saying:
"A neutral power is not at liberty to decide according to her con-
venience, whether she will perform her neutral obligations or not; she
449 How. 603, 614 (1850).
45 Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (C. C. D. Md. 1861).
464 Wall. 2 (1866).
4713 How. 498 (1851).
48 Fed. Cas. No. 511 (C. C. D. Md. 1886).
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is bound to perform them, and if she fails to do so, she becomes herself
responsible for the injury which she ought to have prevented."
In a number of cases which have since become leading, Taney
laid down principles of what is now called administrative law,
concerning the relations of the state or its officials to private
citizens. In the opinion in Beers v. State of Arkansas,49 he
pointed out without leaning on prior authority that the suability
of a state depends upon its own consent, and that even though
once given, that consent is not a contract and may be withdrawn
or limited without impairing the contract clause. He did not
take the position more recently and unjustifiably assumed in
dicta of the Court, that no government permits itself to be sued
in tort and that the state is above the law. This doctrine for
some time delayed the enactment of statutes enabling the citizen,
injured by the tortious operation of the administrative machin-
ery of government, to sue for his injury; and while many states
have now opened themselves to suit in tort, notably New York,
we still await the passage of the Federal Tort Claims bill, now
under consideration and refinement for over a decade.
In the two cases of Kendall v. Stokes,50 and Decatur v. Pauld-
ing,51 Taney's Court worked out the principles underlying the
distinction between the ministerial and discretionary duties of
executive officers of the Federal Government, the position of the
courts of the District of Columbia and the proper court to issue
a writ of mandamus to federal officials, determinations which
are still authoritative. Although Taney dissented in the first
case, on the power of the Circuit Court of the District of Colum-
bia (now the Supreme Court of the District) to issue mandamus,
he accepted the decision in the second case as conclusive and
wrote one of his excellent original opinions on the scope of the
discretionary power of a Cabinet officer and its uncontrollability
by the judiciary.
Taney's significant judicial service to the nation became over-
shadowed by the controversy over slavery. Perhaps it is not
important now to rehearse his position as a judge in dealing
with this question. But it seems clear that he was not a slave-
holder, was a thorough humanitarian, deplored slavery as an
49 20 How. 527 (1857).
5012 Pet. 524 (1838); second case, 3 How. 87 (1845) (by Taney,
C. 3.).
5' 14 Pet. 497 (1840).
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institution, and hoped, like Jefferson, to see it abolished by grad-
ual peaceful efforts. Unhappily, zealots prevented so wise a
solution. In the slavery issues that came before the Court,
Taney was as objective and as judicial as he was in his other
cases. He did believe as a lawyer that the status of persons as
free or slave was a matter of state law, that the Federal Fugitive
Slave Act was constitutional, and that no state could interfere
with the recovery under it of an escaped slave. In the division
of authority between state and nation, he upheld the rights of
each in their respective spheres. But unhappily he was tempted
by Judge McLean, dissenter in the Dred Scott case, to decide
more than was necessary for the adjudication of the status of
Dred Scott, and held not only that he was not a citizen but could
not become one, and that Congress had no power to prohibit
slavery in the Territories. Taney possibly believed that a judi-
cial decision could settle the bitter conflict; and while the people
of the United States have commendably trained themselves to
accept from judicial tribunals more vital decisions than the peo-
ple of any other country, Taney over-estimated the power of a
court to settle issues that have become or been made by evan-
gelists, moral and political. Taney thought the issue merely
legal, and wrote accordingly. Historically and legally, his deci-
sion was probably sound, though it was unfairly misconstrued
and misrepresented and he himself disgracefully villified. But
for the Abolitionists, whose excessive virtue could not withstand
the exigencies of caution, patience and tolerance, the issue might
have been settled by time or by constitutional methods. In-
quirers into the origins of war and devotees of the theory of
"enforcing peace" will do well to study the psychology and prac-
tices of the Abolitionists and the consequences of irritation and
of inflaming opinion as a way to peace. That the Court was able
to withstand the attacks made upon it is an evidence of its inte-
gral and impregnable place in American political life. A volatile
people, without those factors of stability like monarchy or age-
old tradition which some foreign peoples possess, needs and
should cherish a Court which by and large has performed its
functions with extraordinary ability and sagacity. Yet the fact
that it has become by adventitious circumstances and by judi-
cial inflation of the due process clause the arbiter of social
policy and hence a third political chamber should induce the
Court, in its own interest and for the perpetuation of the Con-
stitution, to refrain from the narrow judicial dialectics which
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overturn legislatively declared policies of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. Limitation, not expansion, of power,
will be the best guaranty of the longevity of the Court. Among
the architects of its jurisprudence and of the constitutional
framework under which we live, few judges have erected to
themselves greater monuments than the pioneering opinions of
Chief Justice Taney.
